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Cert to CA 2

RADZANOWER

( E~ G~n,
order

v.

Pollack)

Federal/ civil

TOUCHE, ROSS & CO. ,
ET AL.
Timely
Petr sued the First National Bank of Boston, alleging that the Bank with
other defendants had violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S. C. § 78a
et seq., state law, and common law.

The DC (S.D. N.Y., MacMahon) granted the

Bank's motion to dismiss, holding that it had not waived its right to be sued only
in D. Mass. under the venue provisions of the National B a nk Act, 12 U.S. C. § 94.
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CA 2 affirmed without opinion.
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Petr argues that the more liberal provisions of the

Securitie s Exchange Act should govern.
1.

FACTS:

The National Bank Act's ven ue provisions permit a national

bank to b e sued on ly in the territorial jurisdictions (federal, state, or municipal)
in which the bank is J.ocated.

12 U.S. C. § 94.

venue of suits brought under it

11

The Securitie s Exchange Act lays the

in the district wherein any act or transaction con-

stituting the dolation occurred, . . . or in the district wherein the defendant is
found or is an inhabitant or transacts business • . . .

11

15 U.S. C. § 78aa.

On at

least two occasions prior to the commenceme.nt of this suit, CA 2 held that the venue
provisions of the National Bank Act govern in a suit against a bank under the
,.,

Securities Exchange A ct.

......

Klein v. Bower, 42 ·1 F. 2d 338 (2 Cir. 1970); Bruns,

Nordeman & Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F. 2d 300 (2 ·cir. ),
cert denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968).
Petr brought suit inS. D. N.Y. and opposed a motion to dismiss the Bank by
arguing that the Bank had waived its right to restrictive venue in a document

designating the I\'e\\' York Superintendent of Banks as its agent for service of process,
The DC found no \"-'aiver, and CA 2 agreed.
In both co urts, petr argued directly only the waiver issue, which is not
\

raised here.

In its 1nemoranda below, petr did note the different venue provisions

of the Secur ities Exchange Act, but recognized as settled law inCA 2 the proposition
that the narrower provisions of the National Bank Act govern.

On oral argument

before CA 2, petr adverted to a CA 3 decision explicitly adopting the contrary
position, Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aldicnp.csellschaft, 483 F. 2d 852 (3 Cir. 1973),
but refus ed to suggest that CA 2 reverse its position; the case was cited for th e
proposition that \vaiver should be liberally found,

\

- 3 -

2.

CONTENTIONS: Pctr argues that the circuits are split on the issue of

just what venue provisions should govern suits ·against national banl<:s brought under
the fedeyal

securit~es

laws.

CA 3's position is correct for the reasons that court

stated in rejecting CA 2's conclu s ion:

the purposes of the securities laws require

that its broader venue provisions govern; the legislative history of the Act does not
indicate any intent to exernpt banks

from~

provisions of the National Bank Act have

its venue provisions; the limited venue
com~e

under heavy scholarly fire.

Resp argues that petr did not raise below the issue he seeks to present here,
and explains the history of the case as sun1marized above.

If the issue is properly

before the Court, then-the case does not warrant review because (a) CA 2's position
is correct, and (b) the record does not contain any re-examination by CA 2 of its
position in light of Ronson, theCA 3 case.
3,

DISCUSSION:

Resp cites three cases for the proposition that petr may

not raise the issue he seeks to raise.

Neely v. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.S. 317

(1967); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S, 339 (1958); Busty v. United States, 382 'L. S.
694 (1931).

In each the Court refused to deal with an issue wholly unlike and

unrelated to the matters raised on appeal.

These cases arguably should not control

here, where the existence of the legal issue was clear on the face of petr' s
memoranda in the trial and appellate courts; petr simply chose not to ask CA 2 to
reverse its settled position.

Little would be added by requiring him to have done

so in this case, since the issue-- which is exclusively an issue of law --is
adequately framed by the differing views of the Courts of Appeals.
The conflict among thP circuits is real.
rejected CA 2' s position.

CA 3 specifically considered and

The conflict is not among a::> many circuits as petr

- 4 -

suggests, bowncr, wben he lines CA 9 up with CA 2.

The Ninth Circuit did apply

the Banldng Act v0nue provisions in a suit unde ·r the securities laws, but it d;d so
without dis c ussin r 1he issue petr seeks to present.
Hill, 434 F. 2d 1019 (9 Cir. 1970).
~.;upport

United States National Bank v .

Several cases in this Court that resp ci1cs in

of its JJObHion are not dispositive, since they applied the Bank Act provisions

in the face of diffe,rent, state venue provisions.

See,

~·,

Mercantile National Bank

v . Langdeau , 371 U.S. 555 (1963).
There i s a res pons e.
Rossiter

J0/6/75
DK

DC Op in petn; petr' s briefs
below in response

Court

CA - 2

Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued .................. . , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 . . .
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BOBTAIL MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Greg Palm

DATE:

March 27, 1976

No. 75-268 Radzanower v. First National
Bank of Boston
The issue in this case is whether § 94 of the National
Bank Act (Bank Act) has been impliedly repealed by the venue
provisions of § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1 934
(Exchange Act).

I recommend that the decision below, holding

that there has been no such repeal, be affirmed.

The issue

is a close one, however, since from a "policy" viewpo i nt there
is almost nothing to be said for the most restrictive venue
provisions of the National Bank Act and since I think the
Court would like to see the SEC "win" one for a change - although
no matter which way the case goes the practical effects of the
decision will not be great.
I.

Permissive/Prohibitive:
Pet i tioners contend that § 94 is "permissive," while

respondents contend that it is "prohibitive."
are correct.

Respondents

The section is prohibitive in the sense that

actionsagainst national banks must be brought in the district
in which the bank is established, unless Congress provides
otherwise in another statute.

This follows from the Court's

decisions in Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S.
555 (1963) and Michigan National Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S.

2.

591 (1963), where it was held that a State could not authorize
suits against a national bank in courts other than those
permitted by Congress.
II.

Repeal by Implication:
On its face the venue provision of the Exchange Act

permits national banks to be sued other than in the districts

.

where
they are established.*
......___

-

The question is therefore whether

Congress intended to permit national banks charged with a
violation of the Exchange Act to be sued in forums other than
those provided for by the Bank Act.

The Respondent's Brief

does an excellent job of surmnarizing the "law" to be applied
in answering this question:
"In order to establish that section 27 of the
Exchange Act impliedly repealed section 94,
petitioner must demonstrate that: (i) the
intention of Congress to repeal the earlier
statute is clear and manifest and (ii) there
is a positive repugnancy between the two statutes.
Petitioner bears the burden of persuasion on
each of these issues. Amell v. United States,
384 U.S. 158, 165-166 (1968); Bu1ova Watch Co.
v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961);
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp.,
353 u.s. 222, 228-229 (1957)."
In the leading case of United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S.
188, 198-199 (1939), the Court stated:
"It is a cardinal principle of construction that
repeals by implication are not favored. When
there are two acts upon the same subject, the
rule is to give effect to both if possible.
[citations omitted]. The intention of the
*See the attached copies of § 27 of the Exchange Act and § 94
of the Bank Act.

3.
le islature to re eal 'must be clear and manifest'
citations omitte . It is no·t . su icient . . .
'to establish that subsequent laws cover some or
even all of the cases provided for by [the prior
act]; for they may be merely affirmative, or
cumulative, or auxilliary'. There must be 'a
positive reaugnancy between the provisions of the
new law, an those of the old; and even then the
old law is repealed by implication only pro tanto
to the extent of the repugnancy.'"
"With respect to the Exchange Act specifically
'[r]epeal is to be regarded as implied only if
necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work,
and even then only to the minimum extent necessary.
This is the guiding princi~le to reconciliation of
the two statutory schemes. Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)."(e~~acl.W)

...

The evidence on this issue is paper thin.
........

First, despite

respondents' protestations to the contrary, it appears that
Congress was aware that national banks might be involved in
the kind of conduct prohibited by the Exchange Act.

Thus

Congress had before it a report of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency that discussed abuses on the part of
investment and commercial banks in connection with securities
transactions.

S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Gong., 2d Sess. (1934).

Respondents discount this report on the ground that it relates
to the Glass-Steagall Act of 1934.

As petitioner points out,

however, there is no question that the Exchange Act applies
to national banks and that when Congress did not want a
particular provision to apply, it specifically carved out an
exception.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(i) (administrative and enforce-

ment of Exchange Act's registration and proxy provisions over
the national banks issuance of securities vested in the

4.
Comptroller of the Currency).

Second, the

House bill had limited venue in actions brought to enforce
the civil liabilities of the Exchange Act to the district
where the defendant was an inhabitant or had its principal
place of business, or in the district where the sale took place.
The Senate version, which was eventually adopted, expanded
the venue provisions to include any district where the defendant
might be found or transacts business.

These expansive provisions

suggest that Congress was well aware of the "national"
character of securities fraud and that broad venue pr ovisions
were important to the enforcement of the Exchange Act.
Congress did make certain provisions of the Exchange
Act expressly not applicable to national banks.

From this,

petitioners argue that Congress was aware of the special
position of national banks and that where no special provision
was made for them, none was intended.
argument necessarily compelling.

I don't find that

Congress was no doubt aware

of the venue provisions of the Bank Act and gave no specific
indication that it wished to repeal them in cases alleging
securities fraud.

Relying on the Canon that "repeals by

implication are not favored" and the fact that (1) there is
no evidence Congress intended any such repeal and (2) there
is no "positive repugnancy" between the provisions of the
two Acts (i.e., they can exist and have meaningful content
side-by-side), I would think the correct conclusion is no
repeal was accomplished by the Exchange Act. See pp. l·~ s~.

5.
~ sc<!:..
The most powerful argument against the conclusion that

there was no implied repeal here rests on the idea that the

-----

venue provisions of the Exchange Act are "special", in contrast
to the "general" venue provisions such as those established by
28 U.S.C. § 1391.*

The argument is that Congress made a very

specific decision:

in order to effectuate the purpose of the

Exchange Act broad venue is necessary.

Thus, although the

Bank Act contains a specific venue provisions regarding actions
against national banks, the Exchange Act contains an equally
specific venue provision concerning securities fraud actions.
If the Court opts for repeal by implication this is the line
of argument that it must push.

The chief difficulty that I

have with it is that the Bank Act venue provision is clearly
more "special" than the Exchange Act.

There likely are venue

provisions contained in all types of regulatory statutes
proscribing various forms of behavior.

But this does not

mean that the earlier bank Act provision was impliedly repealed
just because in some circumstances a national bank might be sued
under the latter act.
The policy considerations all favor the petitioner yet

7.

they are not that compelling and are relevant only insofar
as the Court treats them as evidence of what Congress intended
*28 U.S.C. § 139l(c) provides that "[a] corporation may be
sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial
district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes." See Buffum v. Chase National Bank
of the Citl of New York, 192 F.2d 58 (CA7) cert. denied, 342
U.S. 944 ( 951)7
venue provisions of § 1391 did not repeal
§ 94 of the BanK Act\.

6.

when it enacted the Exchange Act.

The purpose of the National

Bank Act's restrictive venue provision was to protect against
the disruption of bank operations that would naturally follow
from compelling the production of bank records to a distant
forum in an age of slow transportation and backward copying
technology.

Yet Congress has not expressly repealed the Bank

Act's venue provisions originally enacted in 1863.

There is

no doubt that a decision in favor of respondents would have
some adverse effect on the enforcement of the Exchange Act.
In cases where national banks are defendants, multiple suits
may be required.

This obviously results in a needless

expenditure of judicial time and party resources.

Moreover,

~ 1. some private plaintiffs may be forced to forego actions against
~

banks.

There is also the possibility of conflicting adjudica-

tions based on the same securities transactions.

Finally, as

the SEC points out, if the district court in which venue lies
under the Bank Act is over a hundred miles from the district
in which witnesses are located, these witnesses could not be
compe 11e d to appear.

Fe d . R.

.

C~v.

~ ~ ....~ ~
P. 4 5 ( e ) . ~
•

It is not clear, however, how much weight these "policy"
considerations in favor of repeal should be given.

As I

view the situation we are weighing a modest impai rment of the
Exchange Act against the now negligible interests that are
protected by § 94 of the Bank Act.

Compare Gordon v. New York

Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United States v.
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S.

7.

694 (1975); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341
(1963).

Plaintiffs are not forced to abandon meritorious claims

nor is there a conflict over the substantive provisions of
the Exchange Act.

They must simply bring their claims in a

forum that will be more inconvenient in some circumstances.
Also, the problem of unavailability of compulsory process
against witnesses alluded to above may occur in some circumstances even under § 27 of the Exchange Act.

There certainly

is no "positive repugnancy" here that is impossible to
reconcile without a repeal.
III.

Conclusions:
In sum, this case is one of an intermitant series of

unimportant Circuit Conflicts that may some day be passed
off on a National Court of Appeals.

Since we are stuck with

it, however, I think that you should vote to affirm.

This

recommendation is very tentative, however, since my only
"real" concern is that an opinion reversing may mess U
J?
repeal-by-implication law in order to bring the case within
the
'"

establis he d fl amew~ rk

::w:a

_....,-....-

.._.

(Cf. Colorado River cases).

I do

think that a narrow opinion could be written supporting reversal:
it would emphasize (1) Congressional intent in establishing
the broad venue provisions of the Exchange Act; (2) fact that
the venue provision of the Exchange Act is "special, not

8.

"general"*; (3) it is impossible for us to believe that Congress
would have wanted to exempt the national banks from the Exchange
Act venue provision:

(a) plain language, (b) fact that exempted

banks in specified situations.

This result is also appealing

in that although I think that the Court has done an excellent
job in the securities area this year, it would be nice if the
SEC prevailed for once (although any victory here is minor)/'".,,_.

G.P.
ss
*Some reliance could be placed on Stonite Products Co. v.
Melvin Loyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942) (holding patent venue
provisions not repealed by a subsequent statute with general
venue provision), that the Exchange Act is "special" like the
Patent Act. The argument obviously is weak.
*.,.'"Attached is Judge Friendly 1 s opinion in Brums Nordeman .& Co.
v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.Zd 300 (CA2),
cert denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968), which is the major Second
C~rcu~t case supporting the conflict here.

The venue provision of the National Bank Act (12
U.S.C. §94) provides :
"Actions and proceedings against any association
under,this Chapter may be had in any district or _
territorial court of the United States held within
the district in which such association may be
established, or in any state, county, or municipal
court in the county, or municipal court in the
county or city in which said association is located
having jurisdiction in similar cases."

The Securities Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. §78aa) provides:
"The district courts of the United States, and the
United States courts of any territory or other
place subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States - shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
violations of this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity
and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or du~y created by this chapter or -the
rules and regulations thereunder. Any criminal
proceeding may be brought in the district
wherein any act or transaction constituting the
violation occurred. Any suit or action to enforce
any liability ' or duty created by this chapter or
rules and regula_tions thereunder, or to enjoin any
violation of such chapter or rules and
regulations, may be brought in any such district
or in the district wherein the defendant is found
or is an inhabitant or transacts business; and
. process in such cases may be served in any other
district of which the defendant IS an
inhabitant . . . . "

196 U.S. 375, 398, 25 S.Ct. 276, 280, 49
L.Ed. 518 (1905) that "commerce among
the states is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn for the
course of business," and of the broad
interpretation given the statute in other
circuits. Sterling v. United States, 333
F.2d 443 (9 Cir. 1964); United States v.
Berger, 338 F.2d 485, 487 (2 Cir. 1964);
United States v. D'Antonio, 342 F.2d 667
(7 Cir. 1965). In our view it does not
unduly stretch the concept of a continuing, though interrupted, shipment in
commerce to apply it here, where sugar,
purchased in Puerto Rico, was shipped to
Baltimore and held temporarily in a
warehouse pending final delivery to buyers in other states in fulfillment of orders previously given. There is no absolute requirement that the flow of commerce be continuous if there is the clear
intention to resume the journey after a
brief pause. The District Judge's findings are not clearly erroneous and the
judgment is
Affirmed.

"established" in Chicago, Florida corporation, Florida corporation's president-principal owner, and Louisianian
for alleged conspiracy to sell, in violation
of Securities Act of 1933 and Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 10,000 shares of
unregistered corporate stock owned . by
Louisianian and pledged to bank and
trust company. The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, Sylvester J. Ryan, J., 284
F.Supp. 387, entered judgment dismissing, for lack of venue, so much of complaint as related to the bank and trust
company, and broker-dealer appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Friendly, Circuit
Judge, held that venue was improperly
laid in the Southern District of New
York as to the bank and trust company.
Affirmed.

1. Courts €:=:>274( 6)

Special and properly wide venue
provisions of Securities Act of 1933 and
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 do not
overcome special and exceedingly narrow venue provisions of National Bank
Act of 1864. Securities Act of 1933,
§ 1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a et seq.;
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 1
et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq.; National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 94.
2. Courts ~214(6)

BRUNS, NORDEMAN & CO., a Limited
Partnership, Plaintiff·Appellant,

v.
AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, DefendantAppellee,
and
The Exchange Corp., Maurice Benjamin
and Edward H. Levitt, Defendants.
No. 344, Docket 31987.

United States Court of Appeals
Second Circuit.
Argued March 20, 1968.
Decided April 19, 1968.
Action by New York broker-dealer
against national bank and trust company

In action by New York brokerdealer against national bank and trust
company "established" in Chicago, Florida corporation, Florida corporation's
president-principal owner, and Louisian·
ian for alleged conspiracy to sell, in
violation of Securities Act of 1933 and
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 10,000
shares of unregistered corporate stock
owned by Louisianian and pledged to
national bank and trust company, venue
was improperly laid in Southern District
of New York as to national bank and
trust company. National Bank Act, 12
U.S.C.A. § 94 ; Securities Act of 1933,
§§ 1 et seq., 3(a) (2), 5, 12(1, 2), 17(a ),
22(a), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a et seq., 77c(a)
(2), 77e, 77l(1, 2), 77q(a), 77v; Securi·
ties Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 1 et seq ..

BRUNS, NORDEMAN & CO. v. AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK & TRUST CO.
Cite as

3~

10, 27, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a et seq., 78j,
78aa; 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1391(a, b), 1404
(a).

3. Courts <t=:>277.1
Where, to bring action against national bank and trust company "established" in Chicago and others for violation of Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in sale
of unregistered corporate stock, plaintiff
would have to resort to Illinois to sue
national bank and trust company, any
action brought in Illinois could not be
transferred to Southern District of New
York for convenience of parties and witnesses, since action could not have been
brought in that district. 28 U.S.C.A. §
140-1 (a); Securities Act of 1933, § 1 et
seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a et seq. ; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 1 et seq.,
15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq.
4. Courts <t=:>268
Where Congress has dealt with a
particular venue problem, broader language in general venue statute will not
overcome this even though literally applicable. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(a, b).

Spencer Pinkham, New York City
(Colton & Pinkham and David J. Colton,
New York City, of counsel), for plaintiffappellant.
John R. Hupper, New York City
(Cravath, Swaine & Moore and Edwin
A. Kilburn, New York City, of counsel),
for defendant-appellee.
Before LUMBARD, Chief Judge,
FRIENDLY, Circuit Judge, and BLUMENFELD, District Judge.*
FRIENDLY, Circuit Judge :
[1] A federal court of appeals is here
confronted for the first time with an
issue 'that has provoked a difference of
opinion among district courts : Do the
special and properly wide venue provi• Of_ th e Dis trict Court of Conn ec ticut, sittm~ by ucsignu ti on.
1
• The statutory history is re counted in
Mercantile Nut'! Bunk v. Lnn gdcn u, 371

301

F .2d 300 (1968)

sions of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
overcome the special and exceedingly
narrow venue provis ions1 of the National Bank Act of 1864? Judge Ryan, in
the District Court for the Southern District of New York, here followed the
opinion of Judge Tenney of that district
that they do not, General Electric Credit
Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc., and Franklin National Bank, 271 F.Supp. 699
(1966), a view also adopted, as an alternative ground of decision, by Judge
Horowitz in the Northern District of
Illinois, Berman v. Thomson and The
First National Bank of Boston et a!. ,
284 F.Supp. 521. The opposite position
was taken by Judge Coolahan of the
District of New Jersey in Levin v. Great
Western Sugar Company and Colorado
National Bank of Denver, et a!., 274
F.Supp. 974. We conclude with regret
that the rulings upholding the claim of
prevalence of the 1864 statute are right.
[2, 3] The
complaint,
summarily
stated, alleged a conspiracy among four
defendants to effectuate, in violation of
§§ 5, 12(1) and 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933 and § 10(b) of the 1934
Act, the sale of 10,000 shares of unregistered common stock of Canaveral Corporation, owned by defendant Levitt,
apparently a Louisianian, and pledged
by him to the defendant, American National Bank and '!"rust Company, "established" in Chicago. The conspiracy was
to be accompli shed as follows : Levitt
was to sell the shares to Benjamin, president and principal owner of The Exchange Corporation, a Florida corporation, which was to pay Levitt out of
the proceeds of a resale. Exchange was
a customer of plaintiff, a New York
broker -dealer. Pursuant to Exchange's
instructions plaintiff sold the 10,000
shares in New York and sent the bank
its draft for $65,000. The bank received
this and forward ed to New York certifU.S. 555, 558-561, 83 S.Ct. 520, 9 L.Eu.
2d 5!!3 (1963 ).

302
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icates for the shares, although knowing
they were not registered and could not
be sold without violating § 5 of the 1933
Act. The transfer agent for Canaveral
refused to accept the certificates for
transfer and plaintiff had to cover in
a rising market, thereby sustaining a
total loss (including the $65,000 payment) of $73,353.43. On motion of the
Chicago National Bank Judge Ryan dismissed the complaint against it and entered the language appropriate for making the judgment final under F.R.Civ.
P. 54(a).
Section 94 of the National Bank Act,
originally adopted in 1864, 13 Stat. 99,
116, provides, so far as pertinent, that
suits against a national bank
"may be had in any district or territorial court of the United States held
within the district in which such association may be established, or in any
State, county or municipal court in
the county or city in which the association is located."
Section 22(a) of the Securities Act of
1933 provides that any suit or action to
enforce any liability or duty created by
the Act
"may be brought in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an
inhabitant or transacts business, or in
the district where the offer or sale
took place, if the defendant participated therein, and process in such
cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an
inhabitant, or wherever the defendant
may be found."
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 contains a provision with
like or, indeed, even broader effect.

I

The contention that the provisions of
the securities legislation should be read
as overcoming the historic venue limitation whereby national banks can be sued
2. The situation would be different under §
27 of the 1934 Act which gives venue "in
the district wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred."
Hooper v. Mountain States Securities
Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 204-205 (5 Cir.

only where "established" or "located"
has much I~ractical appeal. Plaintiff
points out that actions ; herein banks
are sued for violation of the securities
laws are typically multi-defendant actions, as illustrated by this case and
the three others cited. Recognition of
the probable multi-defendant character
of securities suits was doubtless an important reason for the liberal venue provisions of § 22(a) of the 1933 Act and
§ 27 of the 1934 Act, in contrast to the
restrictive requirement of the general
venue statute, § 51 of the Judicial Code
of 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, 1101, whereby
federal question actions could be brought
only in the district of which the defendant was an inhabitant. See also § 50.
If appellee had been an Illinois state
bank or trust company, plaintiff could
have joined it in this action since the
sale took place in New York. Of all
the fagots in plaintiff's bundle, the national character of appellee's incorporation is surely the least important. Compare Liberty Nat!. Bank & T. Co. v.
Buscaglia, 21 N.Y.2d 357, 288 N.Y.S.2d
33, 235 N.E.2d 101 (1968); First Agricultural National Bank v. State Tax
Comm., 229 N.E.2d 245 (Mass.Sup.J.Ct.
1967), appeal docketed, 389 U.S. 1033,
88 S.Ct. 774, 19 L.Ed.2d 819. Yet under
the view upheld by the district judge,
the plaintiff must resort to Illinois to
sue · appellee; it is exceedingly doubtful
whether the 1933 Act would allow him
to sue the other defendants there since
the unlawful "offer or sale" apparently
occurred in New York; 2 and the Illinois
action could not be transferred to the
Southern District of New York under
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) since it could not
"have been brought" in that district.
The result thus is heavy inconvenience
for the plaintiff and a burden for the
federal courts, as against the burden on
appellee- slight in this age of cheap long
1

1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814, 81 S.Ct.
695, 5 L.Ed.2d 693 (1961). However,
although the complaint sets forth a claim
under § 10 of the 1934 Act, this might
well be subject to motion.
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distance telephone rates, efficient methods for copying documents and jet air
transport-of defending an action in
New York rather than Chicago. While
some of these factors also ease the burden of plaintiff in suing in Chicago, there
remains the serious difficulty in proceeding there against the other defendants.

If we were writing on a clean slate,
we would not find it difficult to reconcile
§ 94 of the N a tiona] Bank Act with §
22(a) of the Securities Act. Since § 94
reads in terms of permission rather than
prohibition, it would not be a great feat
of construction to read this as fixing
venue only when an apJ?licable venue
statute placed this on the basis of being
a "resident" or "inhabitant," and not
as proscribing other places of suit when
the venue statute permitted this where
an act was done. s~ch apparently was
the view of Mr. Justice Black, joined
'Jy Mr. Justice Douglas, in Michigan
y .Nat'l Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 591,
'I 5~4-595, 83 S.Ct. 914, 9 L.Ed.2d 961
~1963).
But, equally apparently, this
~ was not t he view taken by the majoncy
in fli at ca~e ana In fh e Sl lgh£ly earlier
one of i\1' e~antile Nat'! Bank v. Langdeau, 37 iuJt"~'""8S S.Ct.=t"2o, 9 i::E d.
2ct"523 (1963). True those decisions concerned the portion of § 94, added in 1864,
13 Stat. 99, permitting suits in certain
state courts and not the portion, stemming from § 59 of the Act of 1863, 12
Stat. 665, providing that suits "may be
had in any district or Territorial court
of the United States held within the
district in which such association may
be established," and on the one occasion
when the issue seems to have been
squarely presented to the Supreme
Court, it placed its decision in favor
of the bank 0n lack of jurisdiction, and
said it had "no occasion to consider"
the issue of venue. Bank of America
v. Whitney Central Nat'! Bank, 261 U.S.
171, 173, 43 S.Ct. 311, 67 L.Ed. 594
~ (1923). However, this COJU:t has given
'i construction to the clause of § 94 deal-

I

ing with the venue of suits in a federal
court quite as Draconian as the Supreme
Court lias done with respect to the state
court clause, Leonardi v. Chase Nat'!
Bank, 2 Cir., 81 F.2d 19, cert. denied,
298 U.S. 677, 56 S.Ct. 941, 80 L.Ed.
1398 (1936), the Seventh Circuit has
followed us, Buffum v. Chase Nat'!
Bank, 192 F.2d 58 (1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 944, 72 S.Ct. 558, 96 L.Ed.
702 (1952), and it would indeed strain
language to say tb.gt t he same verbs
were merely permissive witti re ec o
1 s
er I courts although roh 'bitory
as
to
actions
in state ones.
.
[ 4] The Supreme Court has emphatically held that where Congress has dealt
with a particular venue problem-here
actions against national banks- broader
language in a general venue statute will
not overcome this even though literally
Stonite Products Co. v.
applicable.
Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 62 S.Ct.
780, 86 L.Ed. 1026 (1942); Fourco Glass
Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353
U.S. 222, 77 S.Ct. 787, 1 L.Ed.2d 786
(1957). Indeed, appellant apparently
concedes that the present general venue
statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and (b),
would not overcome § 94 of the N a tiona!
Bank Act even if it did not contain the
words "except as otherwise provided by
law." 3 Its contention is rather that the
venue clauses of the two securities acts
are themselves "special" venue statutes,
and that in such a case the latter prevails. We think it inappropriate to resolve the issue so mechanically. The
question rather is whether, given the
seventy years of highly restricted venue
of actions against national banks, there
is sufficient reason to think that the
Congresses which enacted the 1933 and
1934 securities legislation intended to
carve out an exception for claims under
the securities laws.

J'!qjhing i ~ islative history of
the venue provisions of the 1933 and
1934 Acts indicates that Congress had
given thought to Uie s a us o na JOn-

3. These words in the 19-lS revision supplanteu narrower language in § 51 of the 1911 Colle,
3(i Stat. 1087, 1101.

1

J

I

a! banks. This is not surprising. National banks, under extensive supervision by the Comptroller of the Currency, were hardly envisioned as likely
dES,fendants in actions under £Fie new securities laws. In fact, the House Committee Report reveals that Congress ex- '
pressly relied on the Comptroller when,
in the 1933 Act, it exempted securities
of national banks from the requirement
of registration, § 3(a) (2), 4 and, even
more significantly, from civil liability
for fraud in their distribution. § 12(2).
H.Rep.No.85, 73 Cong., 1st Sess. 14
(1933). Such prospects as that a national bank as pledgee might knowingly
participate in the attempted sale of an
unregistered security, as here alleged, or
that by acting as an intermediary in an
exchange offer a national bank might
join in a violation of § 10 (b) of the
1934 Act were hardly in Congress' mind.
Moreover, if the problem had occurred
to Congress, we cannot be at all certain
how that body would have wished it
resolved; the Comptroller of the Currency now stoutly opposes the broad
venue rule which the SEC advocates, see
General Electric Credit Corp. v. James
Talcott, Inc., supra, 271 F.Supp. at 701.
Concededly the case is not one where
adherence to § 94 of the National Bank
Act prevents a suit against such a bank
for violation of the securities legislation
from being brought anywhere-a situation that led to the carving out of an
exception to § 94 for "local actions."
See Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66, 26
L.Ed. 52 (1880). Here suit against the
bank in Chicago is not impossible but
simply inconvenient. Appellant's case
thus does not measure up to the standards laid down in United States v. Borden & Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-199, 60
S.Ct. 182, 84 L.Ed. 181 (1939), see also
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,
373 U.S. 341, 357, 83 S.Ct. 1246, 10

l

4. It was only in 1955 that the Commission,
reversing more than 20 years of contrary practice, limiteu § 3(n) (2) excmtJtions to issues of the bnnk's own securities anu helrl that American Depository Receipts against outstanding foreign securities issued by a bank mu~t be

L.Ed.2d 389 (1963), to justify a holding
of repeal-even partial repeal-by implication. Granted that the situation
calls for remedy, this lies in Congress,
whether by specification in the venue
sections of the sec·1rities Jaws, by a more
general overhaul of § 94 of the National
Banking Act, see Mercantile Nat'! Bank
v. Langdeau, supra, 371 U.S. at 563,
83 S.Ct. 520, or both.
Affirmed.

UNITED STATES of America,
Plain tiff· A ppel!ec,

v.
Salvatore BATTAGLIA and Dave Evans,
Defendants· Appellants.

Nos. 16312, 16313.
Un.ited States Court of Appeals
Seventh Circuit.
Jan. 9, 1968.

Defendants were convicted of conspiring against builder of apartments to
violate Hobbs Act proscribing interference with commerce by extortion. The
United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Julius J. Hoffman, J., rendered
judgments, and the defendants appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Cummings, Circuit
Judge, held, among other things, that the
evidence sustained the conviction, that it
was not error to deny bill of particulars,
that the conspiracy instruction was
proper, that admission of pre-indictment
threats was proper, that cross-examinaregistered. 22 SEC Ann.Rep. 43 (1956).
While this decision was undoubtedly sound
on policy grounds, see 1 Loss, Securities
Regulation 564-65 (1961), a review of the
lcgislntivc history indicateu that Congress did not specifically conside r this
problem, sec Loss, supra, at 564 n. 18.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 75-268
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Apv.
peals for the Second Circuit.
Touche, Ross & Co. et al.
Hyman Radzanower,
Petitioner,

[May -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opm10n of the
Court.
This case requires us to determine which ven ue provision controls in the event a national bank~cia
tion is sued in a federal court for allegedly violating the
Securities Exchange Act: the broad ven ue provision of
the Securities Exchange Act, which allows suits under
that Act to be brought in any district where the defendant may be found , or the narrow venue provision of the
National Bank Act, which allows national banking associations to be sued only in the district where they are
established.
The petitioner, Hyman Radzanower, instituted a class
action in the District Court for the Southern District of
New York alleging, inter alia, that the respondent, First
National Bank of Boston, a national banking association
with its principal office in Boston, Mass., had violated
the federal securities laws by failing to disclose to the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the investing
public its knowledge of certain adverse financial information about one of its customers, the TelePrompter
Corporation , and of securities laws violations by that
company. The complaint alleged that venue was proper
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under § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78aa, which provides that "[a] ny suit or action to
enforce any liability or duty created [by or under the
Securities Exchange Act] ... may be brought in any such
district [wherein any act or transaction constituting the
violation occurred] or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business .... " The Bank moved to dismiss the complaint
as to it, asserting that venue as to it lay only under § 94
of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C. § 94. That section
provides that "[a]ctions and proceedings against any
[national banking] association under this chapter may be
had in any district or Territorial court of the United
States held within the district in which such association
may be established .... " 1
Following the settled law of the Second Circuit, the
District Court granted the Bank's motion to dismiss. It
held that "[a]bsent waiver or consent, a national bank
may be sued only in the district in which it is established.
12 U. S. C. Section 94." The Court noted that the
Bank was established in Boston "because its charter
specifies Boston as its principal place of business," 2 and
it rejected the petitioner's claim that the Bank had
1

Section 94 in its entirety reads:
'Actions and proceedings against any association under this chapter
may be had in any district or territorial court of the United Sta.tes
held within the district in which such association may be established,
or in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in
which said association is located having jurisdiction in similar cases."
2
The petitioner does not claim that. the Bank is "established"
anywhere else than in Boston. Federal courts have consistently
ruled that the place specified in a bank's charter as its home office
is determinative of the district in which the bank is "established"
for purposes of § 94. See, e. g., Buffum v. Chase Nat. Bank, 192
F. 2d 58, 60 (CA7); Leonardi v. Chase Nat. Bank, 81 F. 2d 19, 22

1

(CA2).

'

.
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waived the provisions of § 94. 3 The Court of Appeals
affirmed without opinion.4 Because of differing views
in the Circuits as to the statutory venue question presented,5 we granted the petition for certiorari. U. S.
Section 94 provides that suits against a national banking association "may be had" in the federal district court
for the district where such association is established.
The Court has held that this grant of venue is mandatory and exclusive: "The phrase 'suits ... may be had'
was, in every respect, appropriate language for the purpose of specifying the precise courts in which Congress
consented to have national banks subject to suit and we
believe Congress intended that in those courts alone
could a national bank be sued against its will." Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 560. Ac3 The opinion of the District Court is unreported.
It has long been settled that the restrictive venue provisions of
§ 94 can be waived by a defendant bank. See, e. g., Charlotte Nat.
Bank v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141, 145; Michigan Nat. Bank v. Robertson, 372 U. S. 591, 594; NationaL Bank of North America v. Associates of Obstetrics & FemaLe Surgery,- U.S.-.
Although the parties each devcoted a portion of their briefs to
the waiver issue, that issue was not raised in the petition for
certiorari. Since we consider "[o]nJy the questions set forth in the
petition or fairly comprised therein," Sup. Ct. Rule 23.1 (c), we
have no occasion to pass on the correctness of the decisions below
on the waive r question.
4
The judgment of the Cou,rt of Appeals is reported, at 516 F. 2d
896.
5 The Second and Ninth Circuits have concluded that § 94 is the
exclusive venue provision governing suits against national banking
associations, while the Third Circuit has ruled that such suits may
also be brought pursuant to § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act.
Compare Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American Nat. Bank &
Trust Co., 394 F. 2d 300 (CA2), and United States Nat. Bank v.
Hill, 434 F. 2d 1019 (CA9), with Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktien~
gesellschajt, 483 F. 2d &52 (CA3) .

'

'
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cord, Michigan Nat. Bank v. Robertson, 372 U. S. 591;
National Bank of North America v. Associates of obstetrics & Female Surgery, U. S. - .6 The venue
provision of the Securities Exchange Act, by contrast, allows suits under that Act to be brought anywhere that
the Act is violated or a defendant does business or can
otherwise be found. It is the petitioner's contention
that when a national bank is named as a defendant in a
suit brought under the Securities Exchange Act, it loses
the protection of the venue provisions of § 94 and may
be sued in any federal judicial district where that Act
was violated or where it does business or can be found.
For the reasons that follow, we cannot accept that
contention.
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a
statute dealing with a narrow, precise and specific subject is not submerged by a later-enacted statute covering
a more generalized spectrum. "Where there is no clear
intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the
priority of enactment." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S.
535, 550-551. 7 "The reason and philosophy of the rule
6 When the Langdeau Court held that the words "may be had"
serve to provide mandatory and exclusive venue, it was dealing
with thE' rE'lationship of § 94 to a state venue statute. Since the
same words arE' used m connection with the federal-court venue
provision, the same ron~truct10n is virtually inescapable. "[I]t
would indred stmin language to say that the same verbs were
mE'rE'ly prrmissive with rrsprct to suits in federal courts although
prohibitory as to actions in ~tatr ones." Bruns, Nordemann & Co.
v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co., :394 F. 2d 300, 303 (CA2).
7
Ser Brown v. General Services Administration, U. S. - ;
Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U. S. 753, 758; Rodgers v.
United States, 185 U. S. !:l3, 87-89 ("It is a canon of statutory const ructiOn that a latE'r statutr, general in its terms and not exprpssly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affecL
the ~perial provi;;ion~ of such rarlicr statute." !d., at R7); Ex
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is, that when the mind of the legislator has been turned
to the details of a subject, and he has acted upon it, a
subsequent statute in general terms, or treating the subject in a general manner, and not expressly contradicting
the original act, shall not be considered as intended to
affect the more particular or positive previous provisions,
unless it is absolutely necessary to give the latter act
such a construction, in order that its words shall have
any meaning at all." T. Sedgwick, Interpretation and
Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law 98
(2d ed. 1874).8
When Congress enacted the narrow venue provisions
of the National Bank Act, it was focusing on the particularized problems of national banks that might be sued
in the state or federal courts. When, 70 years later,
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act, its focus
was on the objective of promoting fair dealing in the
securities markets, and it enacted a general venue provision applicable to the broad universe of potential defC'ndants subject to the prohibitions of that Act. Thus,
unless a "clear intention otherwise" can be discerned,
the principle of statutory construction discussed above
counsels that the specific venue provisions of § 94 are
applicable to the respondent in this case. Fourco Glasg
Co. v. Transmirra Products Co., 353 U. S. 222.
The issue thus boils down to whether a "clear intention otherwise" can be discovered-whether, in short, it
can be fairly concluded that the venue provision of the
Securities Exchange Act operated as a pro tanto repeal
parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556, 570-571.

See also Fourco Glass Co.

v. 'l'ransmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222; Stonite Products Co.
v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U. S. 561 (specific venue statutes for
patent suits prevml ovrr grneral venue statutes).
8 See also lA J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Constmctiun
§23.15 (4th eel C. Sand~ 1972), .
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of § 94. "It is, of course, a cardinal principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored." United States v. United Continental Tuna
Corp., U S. - , - . 9 There are, however,
"two well-settled categories of repeals by implication-( 1) where provisions in the two acts are in
irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of
the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the
whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a
repeal of the earlier act. But, in either case, the
intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear
and manifest .... " Posadas v. National City Bank,
296 U. S. 497, 503.
It is evident that the "two acts" in this case fall into
neither of those categories.
The statutory provisions at issue here cannot be said
to be in "irreconcilable conflict" in the sense that there
is a positive repugnancy between them or that they
cannot mutually coexist. It is not enough to show that
the two statutes produce differing results when applied
to the same factual situation, for that no more than
states the problem. Rather, "when two statutes are
capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts ...
to regard each as effective." Morton v. M ancari, supra,
at 551. As the Court put the matter in discussing the
interrelationship of the antitrust laws and the securities
laws, " [ r] epeal is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the [later enacted law] work, and even
then only to the minimum extent necessary. This is
0 See also Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U. S. 659,
GS2; Regional Rml Reorgamzation Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 133;
Silver v. New York Stork Exrhange, 37:3 U. S. 341, 357; United
States v Borden Co., ~08 U S. 188, 198-199

'
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the guiding principle to reconciliation of the two statutory schemes." Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373
U. S. 341, 357.' 0
Here the basic purposes of the Securities Exchange
Act can be fairly served by giving full effect to the provisions of § 94. The primary purpose of the Securities
Exchange Act was not to regulate the activities of national banks as such but " [ t] o provide fair and honest
mechanisms for the pricing of securities [and] to assure
that dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among investors . . . . " H. R.
Rep. No. 94-229, p. 91.' 1 Its venue provision, § 27,
was intended to facilitate that goal by enabling suits
to enforce rights created by the Act to be brought wherever a defendant could be found. The venue provision
of the National Bank Act, § 94, was intended, on the
other hand, "'for the convenience of those [banking}
institutions, and to prevent interruption in their business that might result from their books being sent to
distant counties .... '" Charlotte Nat. Bank v. Morgan,
132 U. S. 141, 145, quoted in Mercantile Nat. Bank v.
Langdcau, 371 U. S. 555, 561-562, n. 12.
By allowing suits against national banks to be brought
only pursuant to ~ 94, the purposes of that section will
obviously be served. Yet application of § 94 will not
See also Gordon v. New York Stofk Exchange, 422 U.S . 659,
685; United States"· National Assn. of Securities Dealers, 42Z U.S.
694, 1.34-735.
11 The legislativE> history of the securities acts does not indi'cate·
that Congress considered banks as likely defendants in actions·
brought under those acts. While Congress did examine problems
stemming from the relationship of banks and the securities business·
in the early 1930s, see S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Se::;s .. it
dealt with those problems in comprehensive legislation d·ealing only
with banks. Ser Banking Act of 19:33, 48 Stat. 162. See generall~ 
lnvestm.ent Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617.
10

'

.
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"unduly interfere" with the operation of the Securities
Exchange Act. See Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U. S. 659, 686. Section 94 will have no
impact whatever upon the vast majority of lawsuits
brought under that Act. In the tiny fraction of litigation where its effect will be felt, it will foreclose nobody
from invoking the Act's provisions. Members of the
investing public will still be free to bring actions against
national banks under the Act. While suits against this
narrow and infrequent category of defendants will have
to be brought where the defendant is established, that is
hardly an insurmountable burden in this day of easy and
rapid transportation. 12 Since it is possible for the statutes to coexist in this manner, they are not so repugnant
to each other as to justify a finding of an implied repeal
by this Court. It is simply not "necessary" that § 94
be repealed in part in order "to make the Securities Exchange Act work." See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, supra, at 357.
Moreover, it cannot be said either that "the later act
covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute," or that "the intention of the
legislature to repeal [is] clear and manifest." The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 covers a "subject" quite
different from the National Bank Act. The 1934 Act
was enacted primarily to halt securities fraud, not to·
regulate banks. Indeed, banks were specifically ex12

The SEC suggests that its enforcement activity under the Securities Exchange Act will be hindered in cases of securities law
violations by geographically dispersed banks, if it cannot sue all
defendant/:!, including the banks, in one proceeding. The SEC,.
however, was unable to cite a 8ingle instance in the last 40 years
where thii:l situation has arisen. In any event, policy arguments
such as this are more appropriately addresl:!ed to Congress than to.
thii:! Court. See Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, supra, at 563..
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empted from many provisions of the securities laws/ 3
and Congress almost contemporaneously enacted other
specific legislation dealing with the problems arising
from banks' involvement in the securities business. 14
The passage of that legislation and the exemption of
national banks from important provisions of the securities laws suggest, if anything, that Congress was reaffirming its view that national banks should be regulated separately by specific legislation applying only to them. ~
And there is nothing in the legislative history of the
Securities Exchange Act to support the view that Congress in enacting it gave the slightest consideration to
the pro tanto repeal of § 94, let alone to indicate "that
Congress consciously abandoned its [prior] policy" M orton v. Mancari, supra, at 551, or that its intent to repeal
§94 pro tanto was "'clear and manifest,'" United
States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198, quoting Red
Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S. 596, 602. 16
1

13

See 15 U. S. C . §§ 77c (a) (2), 771 (2); cf. 15 U. S. C. § 78c

(a) (6).

Seen. 11, supra.
This intention was expressly stated by Congress when it exempted bank securities from the registration statements requirements of the Securities Act of 1933: " [A] dequate supervision over
the issuance of securities of a national bank is exercised by the
Comptroller of the Currency." H . R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess., p. 14. Subsequent Congresses have continued to follow this
policy. For example, while national banks are subject to the
registration, reporting, and proxy requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act , in 1964 Congress amended the Act so that the administration of those parts of the Act with respect to banks was
transferred from the SEC to the various federal banking authorities. See Pub L. No. 88-467, § 3 (e), 78 Stat. 568, codified at 15
U.S. C.§ 781 (i).
16 In 1959 Congress reviewed the National Bank Act and adopted
an act designed "to repeal certain [national banking] laws which
have become obsolete." See Pub. L. No. 86-230, 73 Stat. 457.
When it did so, it did not repeal § 94.
14

15
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For these reasons it is impossible to conclude that § 94
was partially repealed by implication in 1934. It follows under the general principles of statutory construction discussed above that the narrowly drawn, specific
venue provision of the National Bank Act must prevail
over the broader, more generally applicable venue provision of the Securities Exchange Act. We conclude,
therefore, that a national banking association is subject
to suit under the Securities Exchange Act only in that
district wherein it is established, and that the judgment
before us must accordingly be affirmed.
It is so ordered.
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